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ABSTRACT Serbia and Croatia, both actors in civil wars during the 1990s, started 
their transformation by emerging from the same model of “liberal socialism”. 
The two countries had authoritarian regimes with nationalistic mobilization, and 
their respective transformations developed under the control of their political 
oligarchies. In addition to many similarities, there are also important differences 
which influenced their transformations. Croatia embarked upon its modernization 
earlier than Serbia, and was more developed economically. In contrast to Serbia, 
which suffered international political and economic isolation during the 1990s, 
Croatia enjoyed external support (making it more susceptible to external influences, 
to some extent) and moreover, was more opened to the world economically. This 
resulted in a faster economic recovery for Croatia, and accounts for the country’s 
substantially more favorable position in the EU integration processes. Based on 
joint research carried out in 1989 and 2003, this paper tries to establish the degree 
of influence of the stated similarities and differences on changes in position of the 
working class in these countries, and moreover, on class homogeneity (measured 
in terms of economic differentiation, vertical mobility, value orientations, and 
trade union and political organization). 
KEYWORDS Serbia, Croatia, working class, fragmentation, mobility, economic 
position, political orientations
1  Mladen Lazić is professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade; e-mail: 
bigalazi@eunet.rs
2  Slobodan Cvejić is professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade; e-mail: 
scvejic@sbb.rs
Lazic-Cvejic.indd   3 2010.06.29.   9:56:22
4 MLADEN LAZIĆ–SLOBODAN CVEJIĆ
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2010) 
INTRODUCTION
This paper will seek to show the types of changes within the working class 
during the post-socialist transformation. These will be analyzed comparatively 
in Serbia and Croatia, for both cognitive and methodological purposes. The 
two countries started their respective transformations by emerging from the 
same model of “liberal socialism”, and were actors in the war in the territories 
of the former SFRY during the 1990s. Furthermore, throughout that decade, 
both states had authoritarian regimes based on nationalist mobilization, and 
their transformations were fully controlled by their ruling political oligarchies. 
However, along with these similarities, there were also important differences 
that doubtlessly influenced their transformation. Croatia entered modernization 
processes somewhat earlier than Serbia and was, economically, substantially 
more developed in the late 1980s. Moreover, in contrast to Serbia, which 
spent a good part of the 1990s under international political and economic 
isolation, sanctions, etc., Croatia enjoyed international political support 
(which made it more susceptible to external influences), and was also more 
open to the world economically. This resulted in Croatia’s faster economic 
recovery, and accounts for the country’s much more favorable position in EU 
integrations. The attempt to establish the degree of influence of the above-
mentioned (and numerous other) similarities and differences on the change 
in position of the working class in these countries, and primarily on class 
homogeneity, will use the methodological advantage offered by the results of 
two joint cross-sectional surveys, the first of which was carried out on the eve 
of the breakdown of the socialist order in 1989, and the second at the time of 
a relatively stabilized transformation in both countries in 2003.3
The central concept of the analysis is class fragmentation. Class 
fragmentation, for us, denotes deep and intersecting divisions developed 
within a certain class along different dimensions – including economic 
positions, recruitment patterns, organizational forms, and value orientations 
– thus precluding or substantially aggravating and limiting, collective class 
action for the protection and promotion of its own class interests. In this 
sense, the concept of fragmentation is opposed to that of class homogeneity, 
which represents a basic unity of class characteristics displayed by members 
3  The first survey, “Structure and Quality of Life”, was carried out on a sample of over 14,000 
respondents in all republics of the former Yugoslavia, and was organized by a Consortium of 
social sciences institutes. The second survey, “South East European Social Survey Project”, 
with a sample of over 22,000 respondents in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia, was organized by Tromsø University (Norway) and 
funded by the Government of the Kingdom of Norway.
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of a social group, which is established on the basis of the group’s position in 
the reproduction of the social order, and which create the preconditions for 
the group to appear as a collective actor in the processes of social change. 
For the purpose of these considerations, the concept of the working class 
shall be understood in a narrow sense, including only manual workers – 
unskilled and skilled – without managerial authorities in the work process, or 
with a minimum of such authorities (foremen) in privately- and state-owned 
enterprises and institutions in three sectors of the economy: agriculture, 
industry, and services.
WORKING CLASS HOMOGENEITY IN TIMES OF 
YUGOSLAV SOCIALISM
The key characteristic of the socialist type of society was the totalized 
management of the overall social reproduction by the ruling collective-owner 
class (nomenklatura) (cf. Lazić 1987; Feher et al. 1984). This means that the 
centrally-planned command control covered all social sub-systems, including 
the spheres of economy, politics, and ideology. The abolishment of private 
ownership, along with the market economy, also removed the freedom to 
dispose of one’s own work, while the introduction of a one-party monopoly 
excluded the possibility of the specific representation of the workers’ 
class interests on both the political and trade-union levels, and ideological 
dictatorship imposed a uniformity of worldview. A direct consequence of the 
totalized control over society was the complete atomization of all social groups 
outside the nomenklatura, thus including the workers (Lazić 1987). These 
social losses were, however, partly offset by reduced economic disparities, 
not only between different categories of the employed, but also in society 
in general, as well as with practically full employment under conditions of 
accelerated modernization (industrialization, deagrarization, expansion of the 
educational system, etc.: for the SFRY, see empirical findings in Berković 
1986; Popović ed. 1987; Lazić 1994).
These “model” characteristics of socialism also prevailed in Yugoslav 
society4, twenty-odd years after World War II, although the mid-1960s marked 
the beginning of reforms which will, in the forthcoming period, denote this 
society as “market-oriented”, “self-managerial”, “liberal”, and “open.” There 
were basically two causes for the reform of Yugoslav socialism: due to the 
4  Further references to the SFRY shall imply general systemic characteristics shared by Serbia 
and Croatia until the end of the 1980s.
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conflict with the USSR the communist leadership needed a new basis for 
legitimacy, and its members looked for it in the “original Marxist” idea of the 
workers’ direct management of production. This change, however, remained 
only nominal during the 1950s, until a new factor entered the scene: the 
economic crisis of the early 1960s, which the nomenklatura tried to redress 
with decentralization: limited transfer of managerial authorities in enterprises 
from central planning bodies to managers (Sekelj 1990). Thus the first 
ideological pattern merged with the other, practical-organizational, to form 
a “self-management economy” as a specific characteristic of the Yugoslav 
order.
“Workers’ self-management” had two crucial limitations. First of all, 
the sum of managerial authorities, transferred to enterprises, depended on 
arbitrary decisions taken at higher levels of the nomenklatura, and was 
changeable (subject to political conflicts within the ruling strata as well as 
economic trends), and invariably very limited (the nomenklatura retained final 
control: over enterprises’ funds, through the oversight of the banking system; 
and over personnel through the party line). Furthermore, in the enterprises 
themselves, power was largely concentrated in the hands of their managers, 
while the workers’ councils (and especially their members from the ranks 
of manual workers) had minimal influence in decision-making (Županov 
1983; Arzenšek 1984; Rus – Adam 1989). The consequences of these 
contrasts – between centralized command authorities and decentralization, 
as well as between the command nature of the order and its self-management 
legitimacy – were multiple, of which only a few of the most important will 
be mentioned here. The first contraposition enabled the Yugoslav economy to 
assume certain quasi-market features (a market for consumer goods, a limited 
labor market), and to be partially included in the world economy (Slovenia’s 
economy was an example of a successful “transition” to a liberal economy 
during the 1990s). It, however, also encouraged constant conflicts between 
the republic nomenklaturas for the control of “their own” economies (ending 
in a tragic civil war), as well as conflicts between political and managerial 
elites with the frequent result that the initiated economic reforms, and even 
political-cultural liberalization, were abandoned.
But, here we are primarily interested in the consequences of the above-
mentioned systemic opposites related to the position of the working class. 
The new (self-management) legitimacy pattern, along with economic 
decentralization, changed the main economic orientation of Yugoslav 
socialism by introducing consumption as an objective equal to accumulation 
(for accumulation as the primary goal of socialist production, see Madžar 
1990; Berend 1996). That substantially increased the living standard of all 
Lazic-Cvejic.indd   6 2010.06.29.   9:56:22
7WORKING CLASS IN POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION 
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2010) 
the basic social groups, including manual workers. Then, (quasi-market) 
decentralization heightened economic differentiation at several levels: 
between managerial, middle, and worker strata (cf. Lazić ed. 1994), between 
territorial units (republics, provinces – cf. Berković 1986), as well as between 
different branches of the economy, and even enterprises within the same 
branch (Korošić 1983). In this way, the systemically atomized workers were 
now multiply fragmented, since their economic position and related interests 
were essentially dependent on the work they did (the enterprise they were 
employed in, the branch of economy, republic, etc.). Furthermore, quasi-
market economic reforms during the 1960s gained substantial momentum 
precisely in the labor market, enabling managers to start with large layoffs 
of “redundancies,” resulting in the dramatic growth of unemployment and a 
heavy outflow – primarily of manual workers – to Western countries. Thus 
a new form of fragmentation emerged, based on the division between the 
employed and unemployed.
The effects of fragmentation were made particularly visible by workers’ 
strikes which had already started breaking out in Yugoslav enterprises in the 
1950s and which were massively attended in the late 1960s, in parallel with 
the ascent of self-management as the basis of legitimacy of the order. That 
precisely and clearly revealed the previously-mentioned contrariety of the 
Yugoslav institutional and legitimacy systems. The fact that the workers were 
actually deprived of the possibility for “self-management” compelled them 
to resort to strikes outside the institutions in order to protect their interests. 
On the other hand, the strikers could not be subject to repressive measures 
because “work stoppages” were interpreted as the “self-management right” 
of the employed. But, in this context, class fragmentation was manifested in 
the reality that neither the mass attendance of strikes, nor their public nature 
(generally reported in the media during the 1970s and 1980s), could lead to 
the joining of individual conflicts into a wider workers’ movement. Not only 
did the employees of a specific enterprise fail to show solidarity with those in 
another - within the same branch, or territory, for example – but in most cases 
strikes were mounted in only a part of an enterprise, and manual laborers 
were practically never joined by non-manual workers, including even those 
with the lowest incomes in the company concerned (Jovanov 1979; Jovanov 
1983). Naturally, the fact that the ruling nomenklatura retained full control 
over the single (centralized) trade union organization, and that the workers 
did not even try to form independent unions, played a very important part in 
precluding the possibility of translating individual class conflicts in the SFRY 
into a wider workers’ movement. 
Finally, structurally based fragmentation of the workers was, in the SFRY, 
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accompanied by deep value inconsistencies. Belated capitalist modernization 
here resulted in the wide spread of traditionalist values (authoritarianism, 
patriarchalism, collectivism, egalitarianism, closure toward the world). 
That was, in a historical sequence, followed by the socialist command order 
whose basic value patterns were in many ways homologous to previous 
traditionalist models (Lazić 1994). In addition, rapid socialist modernization 
in a situation marked by a specific liberal Yugoslav model (opened to the 
West) introduced widespread value orientations largely opposed to the 
dominant values (materialism, achievement, belief in science, etc.). This, 
among the majority of the population, produced a confusing mixture of values, 
as revealed by several empirical surveys (cf. Pantić 1977; Pantić 1994). 
Toward the end of the 1980s, all that was followed by additional processes 
with further contradictory effects: growing nationalistic mobilization by 
political elites, which reinforced traditionalist-collectivist value patterns, 
and the “transitional” breakthrough of political democratization and market 
economics, which, externally and internally, precisely supported the opposite 
patterns. It is therefore small wonder that in Serbia, for example, along with a 
highly pronounced confusion within all social strata (cf. Lazic – Cvejic 2007), 
the workers, as the biggest losers both in the blocked transformation process 
and civil wars, were simultaneously, together with small farmers, staunchly 
relied upon by the regime, which blocked systemic change and pursued a war 
policy.
DEHOMOGENIZATION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN 
SERBIA AND CROATIA IN THE PROCESS OF POST-
SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION
As previously mentioned, the transformations in Serbia and Croatia display 
large similarities as well as important differences. These similarities and 
differences will be briefly reviewed in view of the importance of the specific 
processes for the topic of this paper. In the first place, there are differences 
with respect to the courses of transformation. For Serbia, this course may be 
divided into two periods: a period of blocked transformation (from 1989) 
and one of deblocking (starting late in 1996 and accelerated in 2000). It 
is clear that the very concept of a “blocked transformation” indicates its 
contradictory character (for a more extensive discussion of the concept, see 
Lazić ed. 2000; Lazić – Cvejić 2004). Namely, soon after the fall of the Berlin 
wall, systemic changes were started in Serbia by way of the introduction of 
political pluralism, as well as through the legalization and legitimization of 
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a market economy based on private ownership. But these changes appeared 
to be “mandated” from above on the part of the hitherto ruling nomenklatura 
and unfolded under its control (exercised through retained political power), 
thus enabling its members to convert their previous monopolistic positions 
into private ownership.5 Civil war and international isolation in that period 
obviously created favorable conditions for changes of this kind. 
In contrast to Serbia, the Socialist Democratic Party/SDP (hitherto 
communists) in Croatia lost the 1989 elections, but the newly established 
regime essentially retained the same characteristics: in a civil war situation, 
its authoritarian power was based on nationalistic mobilization. The necessary 
openness to the world in this case imposed more resolute transformation 
processes on the economy (privatization, restructuring, monetary-financial 
stabilization, etc.), but these processes in Croatia were also under the intense 
control of an authoritarian government.6 Thus, instead of previous positions, 
the largest profit in privatization was brought by “war merits”, essentially 
reducible to serving the regime, on the basis of President Tuđman’s program 
policy involving the necessity of creating “100 very rich families” to act 
as champions of market and private-ownership transformation.7 In brief, 
instead of two separate periods of changes, we can speak of continuity in 
Croatia, and the process during the 1990s developed very slowly (also under 
strict state control, and therefore with remarkably negative socio-economic 
consequences). This kind of continuity allowed for a peaceful change at the 
2000 elections, which had followed Tuđman’s death, and subsequently for 
a substantial acceleration in economic transformation as well as political 
transformation.
The above-mentioned factors: civil war and a highly pronounced state 
control over the system’s transformation (in Serbia and Croatia), together 
5  Results of this conversion proved extremely successful for (former) nomenklatura members, so 
that in the mid-1990s they accounted for about two thirds of the biggest private entrepreneurs in 
Serbia – cf. Lazić, in Lazić ed. 1994 (much greater than in other post-socialist countries where 
they constituted between a quarter and a third of the economic elite during approximately the 
same period – cf. Szelenyi – Szelenyi 1995).
6  By mid-1990 in Croatia “… social ownership was replaced by state control over the economy 
and its dominant influence” (Sekulić, 2004: 365). For more on the formation of the new 
economic elite in Croatia, see Sekulić 2004; Čengić ed. 2005.
7  Croatia of the 1990s is characterized by “… marked polarization and dualization of ownership 
structure in the economy (the so-called economic tycoonization),  i.e., the creation of a narrow 
stratum of a new private-owner elite directly linked with the political elite, especially in 
industry and banking… Even until the year 2000 the share of non-privatized state portfolio and 
non-consolidated and disputable ownership remained relatively high” (Čučković, 2002: 250).
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with international isolation accompanied by economic sanctions (in Serbia), 
provide the key for the understanding of working class transformation in these 
two countries during the 1990s. Namely, the systemic change (abolishment 
of command relations of social regulation) also meant the elimination of 
mechanisms of political, economic, and ideological monopolistic control, 
conducive to the enforced atomization of the class. However, neither Serbia 
nor Croatia made systematic and consistent efforts to introduce market 
(economy) and pluralistic (politics) regulatory mechanisms in their place. 
Privatization was pursued at a slow pace in both countries, and in Serbia in 
particular.8 Moreover, in view of the large drop in GDP in these two countries 
(which was caused by the war and, due to isolation and international trade 
sanctions, assumed dramatic proportions in Serbia), the economic role of the 
state became much greater (and more important) than its share of GDP.
The overall large drop of income made the redistributive role of the state 
essential for the survival of the majority of its population. A rapid decrease in 
wages and pensions was accompanied by rapid growth in unemployment. People 
from all three categories (the employed, unemployed, and pensioners) had to look 
for additional earnings in order to eke a bare existence, resorting to two main 
sources. First, the above-mentioned late modernization meant that a substantial 
number of the population was merely one or two generations removed from 
agriculture, and thus still either owned some arable land or had kin among the 
farmers. Therefore, one strategy of survival was the return to self-production by 
full or partial reversion to agricultural occupation. The second source was massive 
engagement in the grey or black economy, given ample room for expansion 
through the breakdown of the internal legal order, as well as mostly-criminalized 
international trade - a consequence of UN economic sanctions (Cvejić 2000; 
Cvejić 2002). Thus Serbia, in the early 1990s, formed quite a specific system 
of “triple economy”: the first included the public sector with the prevailing 
ownership and a still more powerful regulative and distributive role for the state 
apparatuses, the second included the gradually developing private sector, and the 
third was comprised of the extremely developed sector of the grey and black 
economy (without either clear or stable boundaries between the legal - state and 
private - and paralegal and illegal economies, due to the collapse of the normative 
and institutional order in the country).
In contrast, the Croatian restructuring and privatization, in addition to 
massive layoffs, included the (early) retirement of redundant workers (with 
8  Thus the growth of the private sector in the economy here resulted from the establishment of 
new (small- and medium-sized) enterprises much more than from ownership transformation 
(cf. Bolčić 2002).
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a substantial reduction in pensions) on a fairly large scale.9 Furthermore, 
in addition to “wholesale” rewards for war-time merits, a huge – and ever 
growing – number of (actual or ostensible) participants in the war, especially 
after 1995, started to receive certain economic benefits from the state. Thus 
pension and veterans’ funds secured the once again (over) emphasized 
redistributive role of the state, while in addition, the impoverished population 
(the unemployed, pensioners, etc.) favored the rampant expansion of the 
grey economy until the mid-1990s. Still, even with a share as high as 25% 
of GDP10, it was far lower than in Serbia (where some estimates for the same 
period place it over 50% of GDP). In addition to that, the grey economy in 
Croatia has been constantly declining since the mid-1990s, and therefore 
would not merit a separate place in this paper.
The systemic atomization of the working class in both countries was given 
a strong situational incentive during the 1990s; focusing on existential self-
preservation essentially hinders wider forms of collective interest-based action. 
This was additionally favored by the formed authoritarian power structures 
(on the part of former nomenklatura members in Serbia, and the new political 
elite in Croatia), which included the control over trade unions. In Serbia, the 
central role in this sphere was retained by the old trade union structures, while 
the newly established (minority) unions were concerned with the political 
task of fighting S. Milošević’s regime (in cooperation with opposition parties) 
much more than with the recruitment of membership or the defense of the 
employees’ economic interests (Arandarenko 1997). In Croatia, on the other 
hand, a fairly large number of new trade unions appeared, interlinked more 
firmly by their shared submission to the authoritarian regime than by mutual 
interest-based cooperation, which is why they were not capable of organizing 
wider collective actions for the protection of the workers’ rights. Naturally, 
the inability of unions in both countries to organize collective action resulted 
in a huge drop in union membership to about a quarter (data for Croatia in 
Hodžić 2005a: 570, Table 3).
In the sphere of political organization, the political space on the left in 
Serbia was still monopolized by the formerly ruling communist party, which 
retained its control over the apparatuses of repression and mobilization, and 
9  “Croatia is distinguished by a very high share of its population excluded from the work process. 
Compared with the initial period (1991), the number of pensioners almost doubled… and 
unemployment, with a rate of as high as 20%, assumed structural characteristics.” (Hodžić 
2005b: 550) On privatization in Croatia during the 1990s, see Franičević 1999.
10  For the results of systemic research into the grey economy in Croatia in the mid and late 
1990s, see Financijska teorija i praksa 1997, and Financijska teorija i praksa 2002.
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all attempts to form social-democratic parties to represent the workers’ class 
interests ended in total failure. The situation in Croatia was different to the 
extent that the former communists were in opposition during the 1990s, and 
could therefore present themselves as (social-democratic) champions of the 
workers’ interests. Naturally, when they took power in 2000, it turned out that 
they essentially sought to implement a neo-liberal program of transformation11, 
while their “leftist” rhetoric successfully marginalized attempts at political 
organization of other left-wing parties.
Finally, the sudden and dramatic aggravation of the workers’ economic 
position, in the absence of instruments for the formulation and expression of 
their collective interests (trade unions and political parties), obviously could 
not create a favorable environment for the formation of new (democratic, 
liberal/non-traditional, etc.) value orientations. This was made even more so, 
because the nationalist mobilization by the ruling regimes in a situation of civil 
war (and international pressures in Serbia) was necessarily highly efficient. 
Thus in both countries, exceptionally favorable conditions were created for the 
reproduction of forms of collectivist orientations (now on a partly changed, 
ethnic basis, strongly supported by the necessity for a central redistribution of 
income in a situation marked by mass pauperization, unemployment, etc.), as 
well as authoritarian and traditionalist values.
As is well known, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina saw the end of the 
war in 1995, which shortly after brought Serbia to the end of its international 
isolation and economic recession. Overwhelming support in the country for 
the Milošević regime rapidly declined, and after the conflict with NATO 
countries concerning Kosovo in 1999, the old regime was finally removed in 
2000 (for data on these and earlier elections see Antonić 2002). On the other 
hand, the death of Croatian president Tuđman enabled the replacement of 
the ruling party at the 1999 elections, whereby Croatia, politically speaking, 
adopted the typical transformation pattern of the former communists’ return 
to power, followed by a periodic change of parties in the lead (Šiber 2006).
The process of economic transformation in both countries picked up speed 
after 2000, essentially following the (neoliberal) patterns applied in other post-
socialist countries. This acceleration was particularly pronounced in Serbia, 
as it had been until then obviously far behind the others. Privatization gained 
momentum, the restructuring of the economic system was initiated (with the 
11  Invoking representation of workers interests brought them a sudden increase in the number of 
workers’ votes at the 1999 elections, but their neoliberal economic policy earned them, just as 
suddenly, a withdrawal of the workers support at the next elections in 2003. For data on the 
class vote in Croatia, see Šiber 2006: 329, Table 1.
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banking sector at the forefront in both processes), the economy was abruptly 
opened to the world, and foreign corporations entered with larger investments 
(participating in privatization more than in green-field investments). The 
state withdrawal from the economy was accompanied by the establishment 
of the appropriate normative order. Having strengthened legal regulation, the 
country’s incorporation in the system of international trade and economic 
restructuring reduced the informal economy, and that together inevitably 
led to increased unemployment, bearing in mind that, the growth of national 
income notwithstanding, the previously low productivity, in addition to the 
closure of unsuccessful firms, also led to labor reductions in successful firms. 
Similar economic-systemic processes including GDP growth, the continuation 
of privatization and restructuring, the decline of the grey economy, along with 
increasing unemployment, were also found in Croatia. In a word, the market 
economy in both countries started to win primacy, both in ownership relations 
(due to the privatization of public enterprises and the increased number of 
domestic and foreign firms) and in regulatory terms (due to the substantially 
decreased redistributive role of the state and the legally secured autonomy 
of market laws), although the role of the state was still large in both spheres 
(some of the largest firms have not yet been privatized in Serbia, and have 
only been partly privatized in Croatia, with the law on revised privatization 
adopted in 2001: in Serbia, in the oil industry and in the production and 
distribution of electricity and telecommunications; in Croatia, in the oil and 
shipbuilding industries, etc; data for Serbia in Transparency Srbija 2004, and 
for Croatia in Franičević 2005). In the sphere of social relations, in addition 
to increased unemployment (which according to different estimates has a rate 
of 25-30% in Serbia and about 20% in Croatia), both these countries show an 
increase in inequality in earnings as well as in the overall income of different 
social groups. It is therefore obvious that the increased standard of living of 
the population is perceived as worthless by the majority of workers, in view 
of the insecurity of employment and growing income disparities between 
different classes and within the working class itself.
The strengthening of disintegrative forces (labor market, economic 
inequalities) was not accompanied by similar growth in opposite factors in 
either of these countries. The trade union movement in Serbia, which in the 
initial years after the establishment of the democratic order displayed some 
signs of revival, practically disappeared from the public scene after the 2003 
elections: the old trade union organization was not transformed, the one 
established in the 1990s was not strengthened, and a third one did not appear. 
In Croatia, the union scene remained mutually divided into poorly coordinated 
and occasionally confronted organizations, which still included a clear 
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minority of workers. The Serbian political scene witnessed the substantially 
declining influence of the Socialist Party, although unaccompanied by the 
rise of a social-democratic party. The SDP in Croatia was, during its first 
mandate in government (2000-2003), repeatedly accused of showing complete 
disregard for the interests of workers, and moreover did not publicly appear 
as the representative of this class for the next four years, until the elections 
became imminent. Finally, the unresolved state issue (related to the problem 
of Kosovo) still dominated public life in Serbia. In contrast, Croatia made 
advances in negotiations for its accession to the EU, and that is now presented 
as the immediately attainable objective of action. 
Some of the analytical-historical inferences offered so far will be 
substantiated below with specific data, primarily those gathered in the above-
mentioned empirical surveys.
SOCIAL MOBILITY OF THE WORKING CLASS, 1989-2003
The importance of mobility for class formation had long been emphasized 
in theory and verified by research (Erikson – Goldthorpe 1992; Wright 1982). 
Research work into class mobility in Serbia and Croatia reveals an upward 
trend of social closure since the late 1970s, which placed the structures of 
these societies among the more rigid in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
region. Self-reproduction of the working class was, along with the self-
reproduction of the middle class, the strongest factor for this rigidity (Lazić 
1987; Cvejić 2006).
As we have seen, in 2003, Serbia and Croatia were, structurally and 
institutionally, substantially changed compared with 1989, and the factors 
which had decisively influenced the position of the working class are clearly 
distinguishable. They are not related only to the transformation of the 
ownership sector and the transfer from the dominantly social to dominantly 
private ownership, nor to the emerging need for a different role of trade 
unions in the context of corporative negotiations and market strengthening. 
During the past ten or so years the economies of both countries also underwent 
structural transformation, following the trend noted in others CEE countries 
and revealed in the increasing takeover of the economic potential by the tertiary 
(and quaternary) sector compared with the primary and secondary sectors.12
12  GDP shares by sectors in 2005, for Serbia and Croatia respectively were: primary – 16 and 
7%; secondary – 33 and 31%; and tertiary – 51 and 62%. 
 Cf. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/
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Research data on intergenerational mobility show the activity of factors 
conducive to the dehomogenization of unskilled workers during the 
transformation in both countries (primarily, inflow of farmers in Serbia, and 
their increased inflow in Croatia in 2003) (Tables 1 and 2). In the case of skilled 
workers, certain contradictory tendencies were noted: the strengthening of 
homogeneity due to increased self-reproduction, and a substantially increased 
outflow towards routine clerks.
As for intragenerational mobility, it also reveals a contradictory tendency 
related to class homogeneity in both countries: intrastratal homogeneity 
decreases to a certain extent (in view of the increasing proportion of entries 
and exits from the groups of unskilled and skilled workers), but it is still 
possible to speak about the growing homogeneity of the working class as a 
whole, in view of the fact that the increased stratal circulation (at least partly) 
develops primarily between these two strata of manual workers (Table 3).
The analysis of intragenerational outflow mobility must be expanded, 
however, in view of the insufficient reliability of the data obtained so far 
as the result of the aforementioned, powerful trend of channeling a large 
part of Serbia’s and Croatia’s employed, faced with unemployment due to 
restructuring or privatization, towards the informal labor market (especially in 
Serbia), or retirement (especially in Croatia). Namely, with the breakdown of 
socialism, the overall integrative function of the socialist enterprise had to be 
replaced by other institutional mechanisms. In the initial period of transition 
this role should have been simultaneously and complimentarily taken over 
by the labor market and the state. The result of inefficient relations between 
these two institutions during the 1990s was the growth of the informal labor 
market (let us recall that at the height of the economic crisis in the mid-1990s, 
the grey economy reached 50% of GDP in Serbia and 25% in Croatia). In 
addition to the numerous standard categories of the unemployed, two other 
categories of the population were characteristic for this state of affairs, namely 
the seemingly employed and seemingly unemployed. The first category 
included those who were formally employed by a public (or even private) 
enterprise, but actually did not work or receive any income, except, at best, 
pension and health insurance contributions. The second category comprised 
those who were (and still are in large numbers) registered with national 
employment bureaus but informally worked for an employer or themselves. 
This institutional arrangement influenced the directions of working class 
structuring, which is why the analysis of mobility requires the inclusion of 
employment in the informal market as a career destination.
Another specific destination created for the members of the working class 
by the ruin of socialist enterprises, slow privatization, and inefficient state, 
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was retirement. The number of disability and early retirements, suddenly 
increased as part of a special program in the restructuring and privatization of 
state enterprises (and in Croatia, additionally on the basis of participation in 
war), gave many workers the possibility to secure minimum social benefits 
and, at the same time, remain in the informal labor market, or turn toward the 
category of small farmers. For that reason we shall also analyze the workers’ 
orientation towards early retirement.
In order to examine the career paths of a large number of workers who did 
not remain in the labor market, we shall compare the respondents’ work place 
in 1989 and their social status in 2003. The list of social positions was formed 
by adding to the positions in the formal labor market (work place) categories 
of the unemployed, pensioners, and those employed in the informal market. 
The last category comprises all those who stated that they were unemployed 
but earned income from additional work (Table 4).
Presented in this way, the research findings best reveal the effects of the 
years of transformation. Naturally the most important finding is the large 
number of workers of both qualification levels who had to change their 
position compared with the beginning of the systemic changes, and that many 
of them in both countries ended in a position of dependence (from the state, 
as unemployed or retired, or from informal employers and whimsy informal 
markets). But, just as in the previous analysis, skilled workers are clearly in 
a better position than the unskilled. Not only have they managed to preserve 
their social position in larger percentages, but they are also substantially 
less exposed to unemployment than the unskilled workers (in Serbia), or 
the retired (in Croatia). Therefore, in addition to their overall influence on 
the fragmentation of the working class, by channeling its members toward 
different strategies of social reproduction, the weak institutions additionally 
intensify the already noted structural division of the unskilled and skilled 
groups.
In Serbia, unskilled workers remained in the labor market more, opting for 
either additional qualification or transfer to the grey market, while unskilled 
Croatian workers were more oriented towards social benefits (pension or 
unemployment). Skilled workers in Serbia were also found more in the labor 
market, either because they retained their position or joined the grey market. 
Croatian skilled workers were less oriented toward state benefits than the 
unskilled, but more so than Serbian skilled workers, primarily with respect to 
the status of the unemployed. These workers transferred to unskilled positions, 
or to routine non-manual positions more than Serbian skilled workers.
In sum, the analysis of class mobility shows that the structural basis for the 
fragmentation of the working class according to the qualifications criterion 
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existed in 1989 and this fragmentation has meanwhile increased. The unskilled 
workers have a less stable recruitment pattern and career orientation. More 
than skilled workers, their fathers are farmers, and they remain less in their 
class group, being oriented toward skilled workers’ occupations during their 
careers. This trend, however, places the group of qualified workers at the 
center, as the possible core for class constitution. This category is more 
consistently renewed in intergenerational terms and is more numerous with 
respect to intragenerational persistence. But the facts that affect the stability 
of the skilled workers’ class position are important economic changes, as well 
as the economic crisis, which have pushed a good part of this group into 
unemployment, the informal market, or early retirement, thus reducing the 
basis for homogenization. It is important to note that although the prevailing 
trends in Serbia and Croatia differ in certain details, they share the same general 
orientation: increasing fragmentation on the whole, especially pronounced 
among unskilled workers, but also some tendencies with opposite effects 
among the skilled workers.
ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE WORKING CLASS,
1989–2003
The homogeneity of the working class’ economic position was examined 
through the presence of economic inequalities. These inequalities were 
analyzed by means of a composite index of economic position. This index 
aggregates household scores from seven components: total income of the 
household; its ownership and the value of the real estate it uses; ownership 
and value of other real estate; infrastructural furnishings; individual housing 
equipment (household appliances, objects of art, etc.; means of production 
and auxiliary farm buildings); vacation destinations; and possession of car(s). 
All components are defined as discrete variables, considered on the basis of 
subjectively estimated market values, and the index of economic position is 
itself presented as a five-interval scale: low economic position, lower middle, 
middle, higher middle, and high economic position.13 Different economic 
position index scores of the unskilled and skilled workers are shown in the 
chart (Figure 1). 
It is obvious that in 1989 both categories of workers in Serbia as well as 
in Croatia were below the economic position average for the sample, with a 
particularly less favorable relative economic position for unskilled workers in 
13 For more details on forming the index, see Lazić – Cvejić 2006.
Lazic-Cvejic.indd   17 2010.06.29.   9:56:23
18 MLADEN LAZIĆ–SLOBODAN CVEJIĆ
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2010) 
Croatia. Although the differences between the two strata of manual workers 
are in both cases statistically significant (measured by t-test with significance 
level set at .000), it is obvious that the redistributive role of the state in Serbia 
was at that time already more pronounced. Similar relations were noted in 
2003, although the skilled workers in both states were then at the average 
level for the sample (and the difference between the two workers’ strata 
remained significant). Naturally, the conspicuous overall economic lagging 
of Serbia during the 1990s is manifest in all categories observed. The lasting, 
substantially better economic position of skilled workers, therefore, confirms 
the existence of the previously noted structural basis for the fragmentation of 
the working class into a skilled and unskilled group.
UNION AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS
Trade union organization, as the institutional basis for class action formed 
on the basis of interests, was not measured in our 1989 research, for the simple 
reason that at that time all employees were formally union members. But as 
we have already mentioned, the social role of the trade unions of that time 
was to atomize the workers, rather than gather them, in view of the state’s 
complete control over the single organization. The situation has now changed 
to the extent that the organization of unions is free, and both states already 
boast of a fair number of trade unions, although they still fail to formulate 
the workers’ collective interest on a wider basis and to protect them through 
collective actions. That is clearly indicated by a dramatic drop in formal union 
membership of manual workers. Namely, according to our research data, only 
15% each of skilled and unskilled workers in Serbia are union members today, 
while in Croatia 23% of skilled and 21% of unskilled workers have joined one 
of the trade union organizations (the overall sample of the employed here 
included 29% union members, only 10% of whom were active, while others 
declared themselves as “passive”). 
If the trade unions are incapable of overcoming the structural fragmentation 
of the working class (at least during the transformation), the question is 
whether there is a political party that could express its collective class interests. 
Judging by our research findings, one could hardly establish the existence of 
such a party in either Serbia or Croatia. 
The thing that, in the political sense, kept workers of different qualifications in 
both countries together, not only during the civil wars dominated by nationalist 
mobilization, but to this very date, is the fact that they see the nationalist/populist 
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parties as the best representatives of their interests. Thus, according to the 2003 
survey, both groups of workers in Serbia supported the Serbian Radical Party 
(about 40% of unskilled workers who answered the question as to their political 
orientation compared with about 30% of skilled workers), and in Croatia, the 
Croatian Democratic Community (35% of unskilled and 25% of skilled workers). 
However, even in this respect, a differentiation trend is noted. If all political 
parties are grouped into a, conditionally speaking, “nationalist bloc” (in Serbia: 
the coalition of the Serbian Radical Party, the Socialist Party of Serbia, and the 
Party of Serbian Unity, which formally existed in the Milošević regime; in Croatia: 
the Croatian Democratic Community/CDC, the Croatian Party of Law and other 
parties that support the CDC), and a “civic-democratic block” (in Serbia: the 
coalition of the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia and G17 that 
formed the basis for political dominance after 2000; in Croatia: members of the 
coalition government in the 2000-2003 period – SDP, the Croatian Popular Party, 
the Istrian Democratic Union, etc.14), we may note the following difference in 
the distribution of the two different groups of workers, skill-wise, between these 
political options (Table 5).
We see that the “nationalist block” was dominant in Croatia in both 
categories of workers, and only among unskilled workers in Serbia; and 
also that in Croatia, skilled workers, substantially more than their unskilled 
colleagues, supported the “civic-democratic block”. It is obvious that political 
fragmentation of the workers unfolded in both states, although through 
somewhat different mechanisms. In Croatia, ethnic mobilization atomized 
the workers with its totalizing approach, and persisted as the absolute center 
of political action, thus reducing the support to the Socialist Democratic Party 
which, at least formally, claimed to support the specific class interests. In 
Serbia, on the other hand, the political axis revolves around the problems 
related to the constitution of fundamental political (state and democratic) 
institutions, which is why a party that would thematize the workers’ interests 
does not even exist in that sphere. Finally, a large difference in political 
orientations of unskilled and skilled workers, especially in Serbia, shows the 
absence of a factor that could potentially unite the two sub-groups of workers 
into a single social actor for the purposes of political representation. 
Naturally, in addition to the structural-interest and institutional 
(organizational) aspect, a proper interpretation of possibilities for collective 
action requires an insight into the value orientations of the working class. 
Previous studies of value patterns of different social classes in Serbia revealed 
14  Šiber differentiates political parties in Croatia as those of the left, center and right (cf. Šiber 
2006: 327). In our classification, left and center are put together into civic-democratic block. 
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obvious confusion in this respect. Members of the working class manifested 
below-average inclinations towards liberal values, i.e., an above average 
propensity for traditionalism, authoritarian orientation, and nationalism 
(similar findings were obtained for Croatia in 1989 – cf. Lazić ed. 1991). 
However, we should emphasize that at that time a slight difference between 
skilled and unskilled workers was also noted (Lazić–Cvejić 2004). For the 
purpose of examining value orientations in this analysis, we have constructed 
a scale of statist paternalism. This value pattern reveals an inclination towards 
egalitarianism and implies state intervention in reducing the economic 
differences and guaranteeing employment. This pattern is therefore directly 
opposed to decreasing the role of the state in the economy and society and may 
represent the basis for social action that would slow down social change, and 
in particular, interfere with the attempts to define the new role of the unions 
(the institution of collective bargaining as a new form of social dialogue that 
should replace the centralistic concept inherited from socialism)15. 
Research findings give the following picture. Although in the period 
from 1989 to 2003 the awareness of the need for as little state intervention 
in the economy as possible increased in both strata of the working class, it 
was, on the other hand, accompanied by the decreasing conviction in the 
necessary advantage of private ownership for economic development. While 
the unskilled and skilled workers attitudes were, in 2003, equal in the first 
finding, the findings for the second show that skilled workers somewhat more 
frequently support the concept of private ownership, although they are still 
below the average for the sample of the total population. This allows the 
conclusion that in terms of its value orientations, the working class differs 
from the other social groups, but is, simultaneously, internally too divided to 
efficiently formulate a joint objective for political action. As for the statist-
paternalistic value pattern, it is accepted by the workers to quite a high extent. 
On a scale of 4-20, where the lower score denotes higher acceptance of the 
pattern, the workers in Serbia and Croatia had an average score of 7. Such 
high acceptance of the paternalistic pattern, equal in both countries, leaves no 
room for fragmentation, but rather evidences the atomization of the working 
class, requiring external (which still means state) homogenization.
15  The scale of statist-paternalism comprises the following attitudes: “The Government is 
responsible for reducing income differences between those with high and low earnings;” “The 
Government should secure jobs for all who want them;” “The Government should guarantee 
a minimum living standard for all;” “The state should intervene in the economy in order to 
reduce inequalities and protect the poor and the weak” (the questions were identical for Serbia 
and Croatia). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is .83.
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CONCLUSION: NEW SOURCES OF FRAGMENTATION?
Our analysis has so far mostly addressed the traditional framework for 
the fragmentation of the working class, namely the level of qualifications. 
This conclusion will use the 2003 data in an attempt to show to what 
extent the modern form of economic transformation has contributed to the 
homogenization/fragmentation of the working class. We shall, therefore, 
examine the economic position, degree of union membership, political 
options, and value orientations of workers for disparities with respect to the 
sector (primary and secondary as opposed to the tertiary and quaternary) 
and the type of economy wherein the workers are engaged (state, private, 
“grey”).
As for the differences in economic position, the score for the primary and 
secondary sectors in Serbia on the 1-5 scale is 2.07, and 2.31 for the tertiary 
and quaternary sectors, compared with 3.00 and 3.52, respectively, in Croatia, 
which in both cases show a statistically significant difference, indicating an 
additional source of the working class’ fragmentation. The analysis by type of 
economy the workers are engaged in reveals an average score for the economic 
position index in Serbia’s state sector of 2.00, followed by 2.11 for the “grey” 
sector, and 2.33 for the private, while the corresponding values for Croatia 
are 3.27, 3.00, and 3.27, respectively. ANOVA has established that workers 
in Serbia employed in the private sector have a statistically significantly 
better  economic position than employees in the other two sectors, while 
this difference in Croatia is not statistically significant. This is, therefore, an 
additional source of fragmentation in Serbia, as opposed to Croatia.
In regards to trade unions, it is interesting that sectoral and ownership 
transformation of the economy has actually made their position in Serbia and 
Croatia inferior to the one they had toward the end of socialism. Namely, while 
17% of workers in the primary and secondary sectors in Serbia are members 
of one union or another, this number is only 8% for those in the tertiary and 
quaternary sectors. By contrast, 18% of manual workers in Croatia are union 
members compared with 24% in the tertiary and quaternary sectors. In terms of 
ownership sectors, 17% of workers joined unions in the state sector, and 7% of 
those in the private sector, while the corresponding percentages for Croatia are 
35% and 13%. In other words, both structural and ownership changes in Serbia, 
for the time being, weaken union organization, while their effects in Croatia are 
quite the opposite. Adding to this the existence of a completely marginal presence 
of trade unions in the informal sector of economy, which is important for both 
these countries, it is made apparent that the unions cannot be expected to become 
a factor in overcoming working class segmentation in the forthcoming period. 
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Assuming that a part of action energy of the working class could be 
transferred from trade union to political action, we should note a weak, 
but statistically significant link between the economic sector and political 
orientation in Serbia: employees in the tertiary and quaternary sectors vote 
for the parties of the “democratic block” somewhat more often (45%) than 
those employed in the primary and secondary sectors (38%). However, 
bearing in mind that this small difference does not detract from the support of 
the nationalist-populist block but rather from the following of other, smaller 
parties, we can fairly refer to the absence of political articulation that could 
overcome the workers fragmentation on the basis of their class interests (as 
opposed to ethnic homogenization). The same applies to the division by 
ownership sectors, since we have failed to establish any link between the 
political orientation of workers and their engagement in the state, private, or 
informal economy. Bearing in mind that in Croatia there are no differences 
in political orientations of the workers with respect to any of the examined 
dimensions, the previous conclusion is still more valid.
Finally, concerning the value patterns, we have seen that workers in both 
countries accept paternalism to such a high degree that it does not leave 
additional space for differentiation by economic sector or type of ownership. 
Further structural changes, therefore, will not by themselves eliminate the 
sources of fragmentation. 
In most general terms, we may conclude that where post-socialist 
transformation and fragmentation of the workers are concerned, certain 
differences between Serbia and Croatia do exist, but their common 
elements still prevail. In both cases, transformation is accompanied by the 
working class’s transfer from an atomized state, characteristic of socialism 
in a state of significant fragmentation. Thus, in Serbia, the basis for the 
differentiation of the workers’ economic position is not only the level 
of their qualifications, but the type of ownership and specific economic 
sectors as well, which also introduce divisions within the category of 
skilled workers. The question is, however, whether the noted difference 
in economic position will be the actual obstacle to homogenization, or 
if the workers were to develop value orientations that may provide the 
framework for unified class action. The lacking element here is a more 
efficient organizational basis. The marginalization of union activism 
pushes all social goals of the working class into the political field, and 
then, in line with their value orientations, most workers, especially those 
with lower skills, support parties with egalitarian programs and populist 
rhetoric. The problem is that these political parties build their strength 
by encouraging nationalism and invoking the past, and are hardly at all 
Lazic-Cvejic.indd   22 2010.06.29.   9:56:23
23WORKING CLASS IN POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION 
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2010) 
turned towards the future and the modernization of the country, so that 
their political strengthening constantly slows down and endangers the 
process of transformation in Serbia and the country’s firmer integration 
into European and world institutions.
The largest advance Croatia has made compared with Serbia has to do 
with the reduction of its grey economy and the elimination of differences 
in the economic positions of employees in the private and state sectors. 
Furthermore, its workers join the unions somewhat more, and the divisions 
along political lines are smaller than in Serbia. However, bearing in mind 
that the workers in Croatia give stronger support to the national-populist 
block than to the civic (and social democratic) one, their stronger unity is 
more of a source of atomization than the means for interest-based class 
homogenization. It is thus revealed that in Croatia as well there are a fair 
number of factors which make the fragmentation of the working class 
significant: in addition to value and political orientations, these include 
the larger exclusion of the workers from the labor market than in Serbia, 
smaller intergenerational and intragenerational self-reproduction, a 
difference in the degree of trade union membership among the workers 
employed in state and private firms, and differences in the economic 
position of those employed in different sectors of the economy. In a word, 
the process of transformation in Serbia and Croatia, instead of contributing 
to the class homogenization of the workers, has probably, by its having 
been interfered with, been caused to have its own pace slow down. Finally, 
we may assume that the process of European integrations will, in both 
cases, play an important role in both countries: that it will (externally) 
encourage both their transformation and their basic class homogenization. 
The key homogenizing factors should be the strengthening of the labor 
market, increased employment, and more significant trade union reform.
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Table 1 Intergenerational social mobility of the working class, 
1989-2003: inflow
Year Father’s class position
Inflow mobility rate 
(%) Respondent’s class 
position
Serbia Croatia
1989
Farmer 47 24
UNSKILLED 
MANUAL 
WORKER
Unskilled manual worker 23 34
Skilled manual worker 14 21
Unskilled non-manual worker 2 2
2003
Farmer 43 42
Unskilled manual worker 32 36
Skilled manual worker 13 14
Unskilled non-manual worker 2 2
1989
Farmer 34 21
SKILLED 
MANUAL 
WORKER
Unskilled manual worker 16 24
Skilled manual worker 28 31
Unskilled non-manual worker 4 2
2003
Farmer 28 18
Unskilled manual worker 26 30
Skilled manual worker 29 33
Unskilled non-manual worker 5 5
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Table 2 Intergenerational social mobility of the working class, 
1989-2003: outflow
Father’s class 
position
Outflow mobility 
rate (%)
Respondent’s class position Year
Serbia Croatia
UNSKILLED 
MANUAL 
WORKER
11 6 Farmer
1989
18 19 Unskilled manual worker
31 39 Skilled manual worker
9 8 Unskilled non-manual worker
3 3 Farmer
2003
20 21 Unskilled manual worker
30 39 Skilled manual worker
12 8 Unskilled non-manual worker
SKILLED 
MANUAL 
WORKER
5 2 Farmer
1989
7 9 Unskilled manual worker
33 39 Skilled manual worker
13 9 Unskilled non-manual worker
1 * Farmer
2003
7 7 Unskilled manual worker
32 38 Skilled manual worker
19 28 Unskilled non-manual worker
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Table 3  Intragenerational social mobility of the working class,
1989-2003: inflow
Year Father’s class position
Inflow mobility rate 
(%) Respondent’s class 
position
Serbia Croatia
1989
Farmer 1 1
UNSKILLED 
MANUAL 
WORKER
Unskilled manual worker 96 91
Skilled manual worker 1 4
Unskilled non-manual worker 1 *
2003
Farmer 3 4
Unskilled manual worker 89 72
Skilled manual worker 3 17
Unskilled non-manual worker 1 2
1989
Farmer * *
SKILLED 
MANUAL 
WORKER
Unskilled manual worker 8 18
Skilled manual worker 88 78
Unskilled non-manual worker 1 1
2003
Farmer 1 *
Unskilled manual worker 20 12
Skilled manual worker 74 76
Unskilled non-manual worker 3 4
Table 4  Change of social position of manual workers in Serbia and Croatia,
1989-2003, by percentage
Social position in 2003
Class position in 1989
Unskilled manual worker Skilled manual worker
Serbia Croatia Serbia Croatia
Unskilled manual worker 23 23 1 6
Skilled manual worker 15 6 44 32
Unskilled non-manual worker 2 1 3 6
Farmer 2 * 1 *
Informally employed 10 4 9 2
Unemployed 10 16 4 16
Retired 33 47 30 31
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Table 5   Voting preferences of manual workers in Serbia and Croatia in 2003,
by percentage
Category of worker
Political option (voting preference)
Nationalistic block
Civic-democratic 
block
Other political 
parties
Serbia Croatia Serbia Croatia Serbia Croatia
Unskilled 50 64 32 33 18 3
Skilled 34 55 47 40 19 5
Figure 1  Economic position of working class, Serbia and Croatia, 
1989-2003
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